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I. INTRODUCTION
In 1983, Rule 112 of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure
was amended to provide courts with enforcement bite to con-
trol abuses in the filing of frivolous or harassing motions and
pleadings. The 1983 amendments to Rule 11 directed the
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1. FED. R. Civ. P. 11 and SUP. CT. R. 11, respectively.
2. FED. R. Civ. P. 11 provides in relevant part:
Every pleading, motion, and other paper of a party represented by an attorney
shall be signed by at least one attorney of record in the attorney's individual
nam..... The signature of an attorney or party constitutes a certificate by the
signer that the signer has read the pleading, motion, or other paper; that to
the best of the signer's knowledge, information, and belief formed after
reasonable inquiry it is well grounded in fact and is warranted by existing law
or a good faith argument for the extension, modification, or reversal of
existing law, and that it is not interposed for any improper purpose, such as to
harass or to cause unnecessary delay or needless increase in the cost of
litigation. If a pleading, motion, or other paper is not signed, it shall be
stricken unless it is signed promptly after the omission is called to the
attention of the pleader or movant. If a pleading, motion, or other paper is
signed in violation of this rule, the court upon motion or upon its own
initiative, shall impose upon the person who signed it, a represented party, or
both, an appropriate sanction, which may include an order to pay to the other
party or parties the amount off the reasonable expenses incurred because of
the filing of the pleading, motion, or other paper, including a reasonable
attorney's fee.
(As amended Apr. 28, 1983, eff. Aug. 1, 1983; Mar. 2, 1987, eff. Aug. 1, 1987).
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courts' attention away from simply striking the offending
material and toward taking disciplinary action against the
attorney or party in violation of the rule. In addition to plead-
ings, which were covered under the rule prior to its amend-
ment, the rule's scope includes the signing of motions and
"other papers."' 3 The drafters' avowed purpose in amending
Rule 11 was to "discourage dilatory or abusive tactics and help
streamline the litigation process by lessening frivolous claims
and defenses." 4
This concern over unreasonable and vexatious litigation is
not new.5 The courts have long exercised the "inherent power
* . . to levy sanctions in response to abusive litigation prac-
tices."6 However, the new emphasis on attorney sanctions, cou-
pled with the opportunity Rule 11 presents for fee-shifting,
lifted the rule from obscurity to prominence in the eyes of the
courts.
Fordham University Professor George M. Vairo has
observed that between August 1, 1983, and December 15, 1987,
there were 688 Rule 11 decisions reported in federal courts;7
and sanctions were requested against opposing counsel 680
times.' Since 1987, the use of Rule 11 to sanction attorney con-
duct has continued unabated. By August, 1989, the Ninth Cir-
cuit Court of Appeals was able to remark that "fully a
thousand opinions have been published explaining the Rule
3. The State of Washington adopted essentially the same language when amending
its Sup. CT. R. 11 ("CR 11") in 1985, substituting only the words "legal memoranda"
for "other papers." For a discussion of the different possible interpretations of this
variation, see CIL PROCEDURE BEFoRE TRIAL DEsKBOOK 11 (Supp. 1986). Under the
pre-1983 FED. R. Civ. P. 11, which was substantially the same as the pre-1985
Washington Rule 11, the term "[e]very pleadings" had been construed to apply to
motions and other papers through reference to FED. R. CIrv. P. 7(b)(2). FED. R. Crv. P.
11 advisory committee's note to the 1983 amendment.
4. FED. R. Crv. P. 11 advisory committee's note to the 1983 amendment.
5. Congress first passed legislation to provide for the award of "costs" to be
satisfied by an attorney who multiplied proceedings "unreasonably and vexatiously" in
1813. Act of July 22, 1813, 3 Stat. 21, now codified as amended at 28 U.S.C. § 1927
(1989). That statute, as amended in 1980, also permitted an award of attorney's fees
reasonably incurred, but the high standard of "unreasonable and vexatious" conduct
continued to limit awards under this rule. See Schwarzer, Sanctions Under the New
Federal Rule 11-A Closer Look, 104 F.R.D. 181, 182 (1985).
6. See Roadway Express, Inc. v. Piper, 447 U.S. 752, 765 (1980). In addition to
various federal statutes that permit shifting of legal costs, including attorney's fees, to
prevailing parties in certain actions, Rules 26(a) and 37(b) of the Federal Rules of Civil
Procedure provide for sanctions to deter improper conduct with respect to discovery.
7. Vairo, Rule 11: A Critical Analysis, 118 F.R.D. 189, 199 (1988).
8. Id.
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and honing its interpretation." 9
For better or worse, the rapid rise of this new enforcement
weapon has not resulted in its uniform application. As Judge
William W. Schwarzer of the Northern District of California, a
noted supporter of a vigorous Rule 11, remarked: "[i]n inter-
preting and applying Rule 11, the courts have become a verita-
ble Tower of Babel."'" Similarly, a reporter for the Third
Circuit Task Force has also concluded that the rule is not uni-
formly interpreted or enforced." In fact, the reporter noted
that there is conflict among the circuits on "almost every
important issue of Rule 11."2
Not surprisingly, the confusion surrounding the applica-
tion of Rule 11 has spawned numerous treatises, commentaries
and studies. Unfortunately, there is also little consensus
among the commentators: they agree only in advising attor-
neys to know the standards of their jurisdiction and to be wary
when practicing in unfamiliar districts.'3  Consequently, it
would be a Herculean task to discuss all of Rule l1's unfolding
developments. Therefore, this Paper will concentrate on the
development of the standards applied in the Ninth Circuit and
in the Washington State courts.
II. PURPOSE AND SCOPE OF RULE 11
The Ninth Circuit has recognized that the 1983 amend-
ments to Rule 11 were part of an across the board effort by the
courts and Congress to encourage sanctions.' 4 In addition to
the Rule 11 modifications adopted in 1983, Congress also
authorized sanctions for abuse of pretrial scheduling'" and
abuse of discovery processes.' 6 Furthermore, Congress did not
intend for the amendments to be interpreted as repealing or
modifying the "existing authority of federal courts to deal with
abuses of counsel under 28 U.S.C. § 1927 . . . or under the
9. Townsend v. Holman Consulting Corp., 881 F.2d 788, 792 (9th Cir. 1989), vacated
914 F.2d 1136 (9th Cir. 1990) (Townsend I); see also Note, A Uniform Approach to Rule
11 Sanctions, 97 YALE L.J. 901 (1988).
10. Schwarzer, Rule 11 Revisited, 101 HARV. L. REV. 1013, 1015 (1988).
11. See generally, Mandelbaum, Amended Rule 11: Despite Wide Application,
Little Consensus Observed, 3 INSIDE LITIGATION 2 (1989).
12. Id.
13. Id.
14. E.g., Zalvidar v. City of Los Angeles, 780 F.2d 823, 829 n.5 (9th Cir. 1986).
15. FED. R. Civ. P. 16(f).
16. FED. R. Civ. P. 26(g).
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court's inherent power to discipline attorney misconduct.' 1 7
Accordingly, the Ninth Circuit has limited the scope of Rule 11
to the filing of "pleadings, motions and other papers" when
other independent rules do not more directly apply.'"
In contrast to the Ninth Circuit, Washington courts have
been less specific in delineating the powers of the court to
sanction inappropriate and improper conduct. For example, in
Wilson v. Henkle,19 the trial court awarded defendants their
attorney's fees and the costs they expended to recover funds
that the plaintiff's attorney had fraudulently obtained from the
court registry. In upholding the sanction, the Court of Appeals
cited as authority both the state's Rule 11 and the court's
"inherent power to impose sanctions," but failed to specify
which certifications violated the rule.2°  Because the court did
not specify which "pleadings, motions or other papers" were in
question, the Washington courts' interpretation of the Rule's
scope is unclear.2 '
Thus, to date, Washington courts have been less clear than
the Ninth Circuit in identifying the specific conduct that vio-
lates Rule 11. Because the Ninth Circuit has limited the rule's
application to specific improper conduct, practitioners seeking
sanctions in federal court should, out of necessity, closely iden-
tify the conduct alleged to violate Rule 11.
III. GENERAL APPIUCATION OF RULE 11
Prior to the 1983 amendments, the Ninth Circuit inter-
preted Rule 11 to require subjective bad faith on the part of
the signing attorney to warrant the imposition of sanctions;
thus, prior to 1983, good faith was a defense to a Rule 11
motion.22 Subsequently, the Ninth Circuit has recognized that
the 1983 amendments eliminated the "long-standing require-
ment that the subjective bad faith of the pleader be demon-
strated."23 The revised rule's focus on reasonableness is said to
17. Zaldivar, 780 F.2d at 830.
18. Id.; see supra notes 15-16.
19. 45 Wash. App. 162, 724 P.2d 1069 (1986).
20. Id. at 173, 724 P.2d at 1076.
21. See Cooper v. Viking Ventures, 53 Wash. App. 739, 770 P.2d 659 (1989) (award
of sanctions affirmed for failure to sign an order dismissing an impleaded third party
defendant upon settlement with plaintiff).
22. Zaldivar, 780 F.2d at 829.
23. Townsend v. Holman Consulting Corp., 881 F.2d 788, 792 (9th Cir. 1989),
vacated, 914 F.2d 1136 (9th Cir. 1990) (Townsend 1); Zaldivar, 780 F.2d at 829.
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"admit only of objective inquiry[s]"'  because comparing the
meritorious conduct of the reasonable person leaves no room
for analyzing the subjective intent of the signer. In particular,
the old rule's requirement that an attorney's conduct be a will-
ful violation of the rule has been purposely deleted.' The new
rule imposes a standard of "reasonableness under the circum-
stances. 2 '6 This standard refers to the circumstances of the
certification and filing of the pleading, not to the merits of the
case as eventually determined at trial. 7
In addition, the Ninth Circuit has recognized that both
attornies and parties are held to an objective standard.28 How-
ever, the court acknowledges that what is reasonable for an
attorney may not necessarily be reasonable for a client.'
Regardless, the standard employed by the Ninth Circuit in
examining an attorney's or a party's conduct for violation of
the amended Rule 11 is an objective one even though what is
reasonable may vary depending on the sophistication of the
sanctioned individual.
Like the Ninth Circuit, Washington courts also use an
objective standard to evaluate whether the attorney signing
the pleading conducted a reasonable inquiry into the factual
and legal basis of the action.' In Bryant v. Joseph Tree, Inc.,3
the court of appeals reversed the trial court's imposition of
sanctions after determining that the lower court's findings of
fact regarding the appellants' failure to make a reasonable
inquiry into the facts and the law were not based on objective
considerations.32
Similarly, in Doe v. Spokane & Inland Empire Blood
24. Townsend 1, 881 F.2d at 792.
25. Zaldivar, 780 F.2d at 829.
26. Id; FED. R. Crv. P. 11 advisory committee note to the 1983 amendment.
27. Cunningham v. County of Los Angeles, 859 F.2d 705, 714 (9th Cir. 1988);
Hudson v. Moore Business Forms, Inc., 836 F.2d 1156, 1159 (9th Cir. 1987), amended by,
898 F.2d 684 (9th Cir. 1990).
28. Business Guides, Inc. v. Chromatic Communication Enterprises, 892 F.2d 802,
810 (9th Cir. 1989).
29. Id. at 812.
30. Bryant v. Joseph Tree, Inc., 57 Wash. App. 107, 791 P.2d 537 (1990).
31. 57 Wash. App. 107, 791 P.2d 537 (1990).
32. Bryant, 57 Wash. App. at 121, 791 P.2d at 545. According to the appellate
court, the trial court did not give any consideration to a series of affidavits submitted
by the plaintiff and her attorneys. These affidavits recited research and consultation
conducted to make a reasonable inquiry into the facts and law. Although it is not
clear, it appears that such affidavit evidence is one objective factor a trial court should
consider.
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Bank,3" the court of appeals stated that an attorney's actions at
issue must be examined according to a standard of objective
reasonableness. The standard, the court continued, is"whether a reasonable attorney in like circumstances could
believe his actions to be factually and legally justified."' Thus,
the court remanded the case to the trial court to develop evi-
dence about the attorney's "information, knowledge and
belief" at the time of filing.'
In summary, both the Ninth Circuit and the Washington
courts use an objective standard to evaluate attorney conduct
under Rule 11. Accordingly, sanctions now may be imposed if
the attorney's conduct is objectively unreasonable, whether it
is in good or bad faith.
IV. THE TEST FOR A RULE 11 VIOLATION
The Ninth Circuit has established that sanctions must be
imposed on the signer of a paper if either (1) the paper is "friv-
olous" or (2) the paper is filed for an improper purpose.3 The
Ninth Circuit has further divided the frivolousness prong into
two parts: (1) filings that are factually frivolous; or (2) filings
that are not warranted by existing law or a good faith argu-
ment for the extension, modification, or reversal of existing
law.37 Finally, the Ninth Circuit has found that a violation of
either the frivolousness prong or the improper purpose prong
is sufficient to sustain sanctions.3
33. 55 Wash. App. 106, 780 P.2d 853 (1989).
34. Id. at 111, 780 P.2d at 857 (quoting Cabell v. Petty, 810 F.2d 463, 466 (4th Cir.
1987)).
35. Id.
36. Townsend v. Holman Consulting Corp., 914 F.2d 1136 (9th Cir. 1990)
(Townsend I).
37. E.g., id.; Maisonville v. F2 America, Inc., 902 F.2d 746, 748 (9th Cir. 1990);
Business Guides, Inc. v. Chromatic Communications Enterprises, 892 F.2d 802, 808-809
(9th Cir. 1989); Zaldivar v. City of Los Angeles, 780 F.2d 823, 830-31 (9th Cir. 1986).
Similarly, Washington courts have identified three "independent and affirmative
duties" imposed on signers who certify a pleading or motion that forms the basis of
liability for a Rule 11 violation. Miller v. Badgley, 51 Wash. App. 285, 300, 753 P.2d 530,
538 (1988). An attorney or party signing a pleading or motion has a duty (1) to conduct
a reasonable inquiry into the supporting facts; (2) to conduct a reasonable inquiry into
the law to determine if the motion is warranted by existing law or good faith
arguments for extension, modification or reversal of existing law; and (3) to not
interpose the motion or pleading for purposes of delay, harassment or to increase costs.
Id. According to Washington law, these duties flow directly from the amended rule's
language; thus, there is little dispute over the imposition of such duties.
38. Townsend II, 914 F.2d 1136, 1140.
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A. The "Frivolousness" Test
The most significant development in the Ninth Circuit
during the last year under the Rule 11 frivolousness test, and
in Rule 11 generally, arose in the decision of Townsend v.
Holman Consulting Corp. (Townsend II).3 Before that deci-
sion, the Ninth Circuit conducted an inquiry for frivolousness
by reviewing an entire pleading as a whole and, by so doing,
concluded that a single frivolous count or claim in an other-
wise valid pleading was insufficient to violate Rule 11.' Spe-
cifically, the Ninth Circuit previously held that "Rule 11
permits sanctions only when the pleading as a whole is frivo-
lous or of a harassing nature, not when one of the allegations
or arguments in the pleading may be so characterized."'"
Under this pleading-as-a-whole rule, even where some
allegations contained in a complaint were false (or unwar-
ranted by law), the court would not impose sanctions.' Fur-
thermore, under that rule, improper inclusion of a party in a
complaint which properly included other parties would not
render the complaint frivolous for the purposes of Rule 11
sanctions. 43 Thus, the pleading-as-a-whole rule provided a safe
harbor within which an attorney with one non-frivolous claim
could "pile on frivolous allegations without a significant fear of
sanctions.""
Such a safe harbor no longer exists. In Townsend II, a
panel of the Ninth Circuit sitting en banc overruled Murphy v.
Business Cards Tomorrow, Inc.," the case that originally set
out the pleading-as-a-whole rule, and vacated the decision of
the three judge panel in Townsend v. Holman Consulting
Corp. (Townsend 1)' specifically for the purpose of eliminating
the pleading-as-a-whole rule.47 This ruling came as a result of
39. 914 F.2d 1136 (9th Cir. 1990).
40. Townsend v. Holman Consulting Corp., 881 F.2d 788, 792 (9th Cir. 1989),
vacated, 914 F.2d 1136 (9th Cirr. 1990) (Townsend 1); Community Elec. Serv. v.
National Elec. Contractors, 869 F.2d 1235, 1242-43 (9th Cir. 1989), cert denied, 110 S.
Ct. 236 (1990), overruled by, Townsend v. Holman Consulting Corp., 914 F.2d 1136 (9th
Cir. 1990).
41. Murphy v. Business Cards Tomorrow, Inc., 854 F.2d 1202, 1205 (9th Cir. 1988)
(emphasis added).
42. Id. at 1205.
43. Townsend I, 881 F.2d at 795.
44. Townsend II, 914 F.2d at 1141.
45. 854 F.2d 1202 (9th Cir. 1988).
46. 881 F.2d 788 (9th Cir. 1989), vacated, 914 F.2d 1136 (9th Cir. 1990).
47. Townsend II, 914 F.2d at 1139.
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the Ninth Circuit's examination of its previous standards in
light of the 1990 United States Supreme Court case of Cooter &
Gell v. Hartmarx.' In Cooter & Gell, the Supreme Court
stated: "[i]t is now clear that the central purpose of Rule 11 is
to deter baseless filings in District Court and thus, consistent
with the Rule Enabling Act's grant of authority, streamline the
administration and procedure of the federal courts. 49
In Townsend II, the Ninth Circuit deteimfined that it
would ill serve the purpose of deterrence to allow a safe har-
bor for improper or unwarranted allegations.5° Such a safe
harbor, the court concluded, promoted form over substance
and allowed the pleading party to manipulate the form in
which his or her claims were presented.51 Consequently, the
Ninth Circuit eliminated the bright-line pleading-as-a-whole
rule and substituted a "straightforward, common sense applica-
tion of the 'reasonable inquiry' requirement. ' s2
The new test adopted by the Ninth Circuit recognizes that
"[t]he issues involved in determining whether an attorney has
violated Rule 11 ... involve fact-intensive close calls.153 Con-
sequently, a district court must consider a number of factors to
determine whether a pleading is sanctionable. These factors
include an assessment of:
(1) the knowledge that reasonably could have been acquired
at the time the pleading was filed;
(2) the type of claim and the difficulty of acquiring suffi-
cient information;
(3) which party has access to the relevant facts; and
(4) the significance of the claim in the pleading as a whole.'
Although the relationship of the frivolous claim to the
entire pleading is a relevant factor for the court's considera-
tion, the mere existence of one nonfrivolous claim is no longer
dispositive of the sanctions issue.' Accordingly, Ninth Circuit
48. 110 S. Ct. 2447 (1990).
49. Id. at 2454 (1990).
50. Townsend II, 914 F.2d at 1141.
51. Id. at 1142.
52. Id.
53. Id. (citing Cooter & Gell, 110 S. Ct. at 2460).
54. Id. (citing Cross & Cross Properties v. SOS Everett Allied Co., 886 F.2d 497,
504 (2nd Cir. 1989) (citing Oliveri)).
55. Although the Ninth Circuit eliminated the pleading-as-a-whole rule, thereby
increasing the likelihood of Rule 11 sanctions for a frivolous complaint, it expressed a
sensitivity to the concern that Rule 11 may spawn satellite litigation and chill vigorous
advocacy:
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courts are afforded a greater opportunity to evaluate the ade-
quacy of an attorney's pre-filing inquiry in light of the circum-
stances of the case; however, attorneys should beware that the
pleading-as-a-whole safe harbor is no longer available to pro-
tect them from sanctions as a result of the inclusion of factu-
ally or legally frivolous claims.
1. Factually Frivolous Claims
Under the plain language of Rule 11, the signature of an
attorney or a party on a pleading is a certification that "to the
best of [the attorney's] knowledge, information and belief,
found after reasonable inquiry, [the pleading] is well grounded
in fact and is warranted by existing law or good faith argu-
ments for extension, modification or reversal of existing
law." "Reasonable inquiry" is the focal point of the court's
frivolous filing evaluation. As the Ninth Circuit has stated,
"the finding of no reasonable inquiry is tantamount to a find-
ing of frivolousness. ' 7
In analyzing the breach of an attorney's duty to make a
reasonable inquiry, the Ninth circuit has identified the "key
question . . . [to be] whether a pleading states an arguable
claim."'  To avoid a categorization as "frivolous, legally unrea-
sonable or without factual foundation, '5 9 a paper must first
meet the Rule 11 requirement of being "well grounded in
fact." The "well grounded in fact" requirement is met when
an attorney or other signer has reasonably inquired into the
factual underpinning of the essential elements of the plead-
ing.6 The signer who certifies that the paper is well grounded
in fact must have acquired sufficient knowledge to ascertain
that the paper is not frivolously filed.
Were vigorous advocacy to be chilled by the excessive use of sanctions, wrongs
would go uncompensated. Attorneys, because of fear of sanctions, might turn
down cases on behalf of individuals seeking to have the courts recognize new
rights. They might also refuse to represent persons whose rights have been
violated but whose claims are not likely to produce large damage awards.
This is because attorneys would have to figure into their costs of doing
business the risk of unjustified awards of sanctions.
Townsend II, 914 F.2d at 1140-41.
56. FED. R. CIV. P. 11 and Sup. CT. R. 11.
57. Townsend II, 914 F.2d at 1140.
58. Stewart v. American International Oil & Gas Co., 845 F.2d 196, 201 (1988)
(citing Hudson v. Moore Business Forms, Inc., 836 F.2d 1156, 1159 (9th Cir. 1986)).
59. Zaldivar v. City of Los Angeles, 780 F.2d 823, 831 (9th Cir. 1986).
60. See Greenberg v. Sala, 822 F.2d 882, 887 (9th Cir. 1987).
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Both the Ninth Circuit and the Washington courts have
determined that a complaint is factually frivolous if "a compe-
tent attorney, after reasonable inquiry, could not form a rea-
sonable belief that the complaint was well founded in fact."'"
An attorney must make a reasonable independent investiga-
tion into the facts and cannot unduly rely on another person's
assertion of those facts.
Often, an attorney's knowledge of the facts is acquired
from his or her client, and in the Ninth Circuit, to a certain
extent, an attorney may rely on his or her client's assertion of
the facts; however, too much reliance on a client may prove
risky. In Lloyd v. Schlag, 2 a plaintiff's attorney relied on his
client's innocent misunderstanding of copyright transfer
requirements in bringing a copyright infringement suit. The
attorney did not first conduct a reasonable inquiry into the
registration of the assignment of rights to his client. Conse-
quently, the district court's award of costs and attorney's fees
to the defendant, incident to the defendant's motion to dismiss,
was upheld by the court of appeals. 3
However, the Ninth Circuit has also recognized that where
a Rule 11 violation occurs because of a "failure to make a rea-
sonable inquiry into the factual underpinnings of a paper or
pleading, the client may be in an equal or better position [to
verify the facts] than the lawyer."M Although a lawyer is not
absolved of his or her responsibility to investigate the facts
provided by the client, the client shares an obligation to assure
that the facts are accurate. For example, in Business Guides,
Inc. v. Chromatic Communication Enterprises,6 where the dis-
trict court judge's law clerk spent one hour verifying the accu-
racy of an affidavit filed by the plaintiff, it was unreasonable
for the plaintiff to take no steps whatsoever to verify the facts
before filing its papers and request for a temporary restraining
order. Under these circumstances, the Ninth Circuit upheld an
award of sanctions against the plaintiff.' Thus, in Business
61. Jensen Elec. Co. v. Moore, Caldwell, Rowland & Dodd, Inc., 873 F.2d 1327,
1329 (9th Cir. 1989); Bryant v. Joseph Tree, Inc., 57 Wash. App. 106, 115, 791 P.2d 537,
545 (1990).
62. 884 F.2d 409 (9th Cir. 1989).
63. Id. at 412.
64. Business Guides, Inc. v. Chromatic Communications Enterprises, 892 F.2d 802,
810 (9th Cir. 1989) (emphasis in original).
65. 892 F.2d 802 (9th Cir. 1989).
66. The court in Business Guides also indicated that sanctions against Business
Guide's attorney, Finley Kumble, may also have been appropriate. However, by that
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Guides, the Ninth Circuit reasserted its previous rule that reli-
ance on a client's assertion of the facts, without more, could
leave an attorney vulnerable to sanctions under Rule 11.
Similarly, in Washington, reliance on a client's version of
the facts may not discharge an attorney's duty of reasonable
inquiry.67 In Miller v. Badgley,68 the court found that plain-
tiff's ex parte motion for supersedeas in a form other than bond
was not based on a reasonable inquiry into the facts, where the
alternative supersedeas offered was a promissory note that ulti-
mately was discovered by opposing counsel to be subject to
prior obligations exceeding its value.69
Although in none of these cases, either in the Ninth Cir-
cuit or in Washington, were sanctions imposed exclusively on
the attorney, it is the attorney who must assert, by signing a
pleading, that to the best of his or her "knowledge, informa-
tion and belief" the pleading is well-grounded in fact. Perhaps,
as Judge Schwarzer has suggested, "if all the attorney has is
his client's assurance that facts exist, he has not satisfied his
obligation," and could therefore be the direct target of the
Rule 11 sanction.7"
An attorney may also become the target of Rule 11 sanc-
tions for failure to make a reasonable inquiry if he or she, as
local counsel, relies on the advice of other attorneys as to a
suit's underlying factual basis. In Unioil, Inc. v. E.F Hutton &
point in the litigation, Finley Kumble had filed bankruptcy and Chromatic had
withdrawn without prejudice the portion of its Rule 11 motion that applied to the lawfirm.
67. Miller v. Badgley, 51 Wash. App. 285, 302, 753 P.2d 530, 539 (1988). See also
Bryant v. Joseph Tree, Inc., 57 Wash. App. 107, 120-21, 791 P.2d 537, 545 (1990) (where
uncontroverted affidavits demonstrated that plaintiff's attorneys consulted with their
client, reviewed documents provided by their client, and conducted an independent
search for documents, there was sufficient evidence that a reasonable prefiling inquiry
had been conducted); Guardianship of Lasky, 54 Wash. App. 841, 848, 776 P.2d 695, 701
(1989) (a court-appointed guardian ad litem made several allegations in the complaint
based only on information provided by the ward; such reliance on the ward did not
constitute a reasonable inquiry into readily available facts). The Miller case was a case
of first impression regarding the question of sanctions pursuant to the state's revised
CR 11. Because Washington's revised rule was modeled upon and is substantially
similar to the federal rule, the appellate court looked to the federal decisions under
Rule 11 for guidance. Accordingly, it is not surprising that Washington courts require
more than mere reliance on the client's assertion of the facts to discharge an attorney's
duty of reasonable inquiry.
68. 51 Wash. App. 285, 753 P.2d 530 (1988).
69. Id.
70. Schwarzer, supra note 5, at 187.
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Co., InC.,71 the Ninth Circuit affirmed the district court's award
of substantial sanctions against an attorney who failed to sat-
isfy his duty of reasonable inquiry to verify the facts. The
court stated that "reliance on forwarding co-counsel may in
certain circumstances satisfy an attorney's duty of reasonable
inquiry."7 2 However, the court continued by stating that "[a]n
attorney who signs the pleading cannot simply delegate to for-
warding co-counsel his duty of reasonable inquiry."73 Thus, a
certain amount of reliance on another lawyer may be deemed
reasonable; however, in relying on another lawyer, counsel
must acquire independent knowledge of facts sufficient to
enable him to certify that the paper is well-grounded in fact.74
In comparison, in Golden Eagle Distributing Corp. v. Bur-
roughs Corp.,71 Judge Schwarzer declined to impose monetary
sanctions on the California local counsel who signed the
offending motion papers, but who apparently did not actively
participate in preparation of the papers or in the decision to
file. Judge Schwarzer did, however, impose monetary sanc-
tions on the Chicago law firm whose associate prepared the
offending papers.7 In addition, Judge Schwarzer found it
appropriate to reprimand both the Chicago firm and California
local counsel by requiring them to submit statements certifying
that a copy of his sanctions opinion was given to each partner
and associate of each firm.77
An attorney is also under some obligation to make a rea-
sonable inquiry into the appropriateness of suing each of the
named defendants. In Townsend 1, the circuit court panel
reversed the district court's award of sanctions where a claim
71. 809 F.2d 548 (9th Cir. 1986), cert denied, 108 S. Ct. 83 (1987).
72. Id. at 558.
73. Id.
74. Id. (citing Schwarzer, Sanctions Under the New Federal Rule 11-A Closer
Look, 104 F.R.D. 181, 187 (1985)).
75. 103 F.R.D. 124 (N.D. Cal. 1984), rev'd on other grounds, 801 F.2d 1531 (9th Cir.
1986).
76. As a result of the Supreme Court's decision in Pavelic & Leflore v. Marvel
Entertainment Group, 110 S. Ct. 456 (1989), sanctions under Rule 11 may no longer be
imposed on an entire law firm. Instead, the individual attorney (or client) who signs
the pleading is the sole target of the sanctions. See infra notes 140-146 and
accompanying text.
77. Golden Eagle Distributing Corp. v. Burroughs Corp., 103 F.R.D. 124, 129, rev'd
on other grounds, 801 F.2d 1531 (9th Cir. 1986). Washington courts have not addressed
the issue of whether local counsel's reliance on another attorney's assertion of the
facts would constitute reasonable inquiry for purposes of CR 11. However, because
this would be a case of first impression in the state, it is likely that a Washington court
would look to the Ninth Circuit for guidance on this issue. See supra note 67.
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of ERISA violations by Employee Benefit Plan administrators
improperly included the plan's attorneys." In Townsend II,
the Ninth Circuit vacated the three judge panel of Townsend I
and affirmed the district court's award of sanctions.79 The dis-
trict court had awarded sanctions because the offending attor-
ney had continued to name the benefit plan's attorneys in an
amended complaint even after affidavits were submitted that
disclaimed any involvement with the adoption, implementation
or administration of the plan. The court considered that such
inclusion of improper defendants, after having been warned,
was sanctionable under Rule 11.80
Although an attorney may be sanctioned under Rule 11 for
improperly including some defendants, if at the time of filing
reasonable inquiry indicates that such defendants are not
improperly named, sanctions under Rule 11 are not available.
In the Ninth Circuit, the reach of Rule 11 is limited to evaluat-
ing the signing attorney's information, knowledge and belief at
the time of signing."' Therefore, a failure to dismiss defend-
ants who only later appear to have been improperly included
may be sanctioned only under the strictures of 28 U.S.C.
§ 1927, which requires a finding of "recklessness" or "bad
faith."8 2 However, if there is a subsequent signing of a plead-
ing, such as a defense to a summary judgment motion, or a
memorandum of law opposing such a motion, those signings
are evaluated in the light of the circumstances existing at that
time, and Rule 11 sanctions may well apply.
Like the Ninth Circuit, Washington courts have also been
unforgiving with regard to the naming of improper defendants.
In Doe v. Spokane & Inland Empire Blood Bank,"3 the court
indicated that sanctions would be proper for frivolously includ-
ing two defendants where the plaintiff admittedly had no con-
tact with either of the defendant's products. Although the
record was not sufficient for the court to determine whether
78. Townsend v. Holman Consulting Corp., 881 F.2d 788, 790 (9th Cir. 1989),
vacated, 914 F.2d 1136 (9th Cir. 1990) (Townsend /).
79. Townsend v. Holman Consulting Corp., 914 F.2d 1136, 1145 (9th Cir. 1990) (en
banc) (Townsend If).
80. Id.; see also West Coast Theater Corp. v. Portland, 897 F.2d 1519 (9th Cir. 1990)
(where improper service on two defendants with an incomplete draft of the complaint
was a factor considered in awarding sanctions).
81. See supra text accompanying notes 26-35.
82. Cunningham v. County of Los Angeles, 879 F.2d 481, 490 (9th Cir. 1988), cert
denied, 110 S. Ct. 757 (1990).
83. 55 Wash. App. 107, 780 P.2d 853 (1989).
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sanctions were appropriate, it did indicate that if, on remand,
the trial court determined that the attorney had not under-
taken an adequate inquiry to determine the propriety of nam-
ing the two defendants, then Rule 11 had been violated.'
However, the court also indicated that if the trial court deter-
mined that, at the time of filing, the attorney was in possession
of information justifying a belief that there was an adequate
factual or legal basis for filing the claim, then there was not a
violation of Rule 11.85
Finally, Washington courts have cautioned that judges
should be especially reluctant to impose sanctions for factual
errors or deficiencies in the complaint that occur before there
has been an opportunity for discovery. 8Y For instance, the
court in Bryant v. Joseph Tree, Inc. 7 rejected a contention that
all the facts supporting a claim must be set forth in the com-
plaint because such a requirement would be inconsistent with
the state's notice pleading rule.8'
In summary, in both the Ninth Circuit and in Washington,
a factually frivolous complaint may expose an attorney to Rule
11 sanctions if the attorney has not conducted a reasonable
pre-filing inquiry to independently verify the facts and to iden-
tify the appropriate defendants to name. Furthermore, the
overruling of the pleading-as-a-whole rule by the Ninth Circuit
eliminated the safe harbor for frivolous claims included in a
pleading also containing a single non-frivolous claim. This is
true whether the frivolous claims are factually or legallly
frivolous.
2. Legally Frivolous Claims
The Ninth Circuit and Washington courts have deter-
mined that a complaint is legally frivolous "where it is not
84. Spokane & Inland Empire, 55 Wash. App. at 112, 780 P.2d at 857.
85. id.
86. Bryant v. Joseph Tree, Inc., 57 Wash. App. 106, 118-119, 791 P.2d 537, 544
(1990).
87. 57 Wash. App. 107, 791 P.2d 537 (1990).
88. "Washington's notice pleading rule does not require parties to reveal all the
facts supporting their claim but instead contemplates that discovery will provide
parties with the opportunity to learn more detailed information about the nature of a
complaint." Id. at 118-19 n.6, 791 P.2d at 544 n.6. This approach is especially
appropriate as well as salutary in cases where many of the pertinent facts may be in
the exclusive position of the defendants, e.g., conspiracy, cases and professional
malpractice.
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based on a plausible view of the law."89 Rule 11 requires the
signing attorney to certify that the facts stated in the com-
plaint give rise to a legal argument that is "warranted by
existing law or a good faith argument for the extension, modi-
fication, or reversal of existing law."'  Rule 11 does not
require the attorney to be correct in his or her view of the law;
however, the attorney must have a good faith argument for his
or her view of what the law is or should be.91
An attorney must conduct the research necessary under
the circumstances and must reach a defensible conclusion.
However, "[e]xtended research alone will not save a claim that
is without legal . .. merit from the penalty of sanctions. 92
Although an attorney may make reasonable arguments for the
change of existing law, he or she is expected to be aware of
well-settled areas of the law.93 On the other hand, courts are
discouraged from finding violations of Rule 11 in such a way as
to chill attorneys' enthusiasm or creativity in cases of first
impression.'
Division I of the Washington Court of Appeals has
rejected a plaintiff's argument that the imposition of sanctions
would chill attorneys' enthusiasm or creativity in cases of first
impression.9" In Layne v. Hyde," the state court levied sanc-
tions because the law was well-settled regarding judicial immu-
nity, abuse of process, and conspiracy. Significantly, the court
noted that the argument for extension of existing law was first
raised on appeal of the order of sanctions below.'
In contrast, in Bryant v. Joseph Tree, Inc.,98 the trial court
found that the appellant's legal research was inadequate
because the appellants had drafted an unintelligible complaint.
The appellants also failed to amend the complaint in compli-
ance with a court order. The court of appeals reversed, stating
89. Aetna Life Ins. Co. v. Alla Medical Serv., Inc., 855 F.2d 1470, 1475 (9th Cir.
1988); Bryant v. Joseph Tree, Inc., 57 Wash. App. 106, 791 P.2d 537 (1990).
90. FED. R. Civ. P. 11 and Sup. CT. R. 11.
91. Zaldivar v. City of Los Angeles, 780 F.2d 823, 831 (9th Cir. 1986).
92. Id. at 831.
93. Hudson v. Moore Business Forms, Inc., 836 F.2d 1156 (9th Cir. 1987), amended
by, 898 F.2d 684 (9th Cir. 1990); Hurd v. Ralph's Grocery Co., 824 F.2d 806 (9th Cir.
1987).
94. FED. R. Civ. P. 11 advisory committee's note to 1983 amendment.
95. Layne v. Hyde, 54 Wash. App. 125, 135, 773 P.2d 83, 88 (1989).
96. 54 Wash. App. 125, 773 P.2d 83 (1989).
97. Id. at 135, 773 P.2d at 88.
98. 57 Wash. App. 107, 791 P.2d 537 (1990).
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that the "[i]mposition of CR 11 sanctions is improper where
other rules more directly apply."" The court stated that under
CR 12(e), the appellants could have supplied the missing facts,
missing dates, and missing allegations the court required."°
When determining the "frivolousness" of a pleading or
motion, the Ninth Circuit also considers an attorney's duty to
conduct reasonable legal research. However, the Ninth Cir-
cuit appears to apply a somewhat more lenient standard in
judging claims to be legally frivolous than do Washington
courts. The Ninth Circuit has held that even a failure to allege
a significant and necessary element of the cause of action after
filing several amended complaints is an insufficient ground for
finding a violation of Rule 11.1
In Golden Eagle Distributing Corp. v. Burroughs Corp.,102
the Ninth Circuit rejected the argument that an attorney must
identify an argument as one for an extension, modification, or
reversal of existing law if it is not based on existing prece-
dents."0 3 The court found that an "argument identification"
requirement "tends to create a conflict between the lawyer's
duty to zealously represent his client.., and the lawyer's own
interest in avoiding rebuke."'1 4 Therefore, even though the
law firm failed to present a valid good faith argument for an
extension of the law until it filed its brief opposing sanctions,
the court held that sanctions had been improperly assessed. 0 5
The appellate court also rejected the district court's sanctions
based on a failure to cite contrary authority despite the identi-
fication of such authority in Shepard's.'"
Even with its forgiving standard, however, the Ninth Cir-
cuit finds some pleadings, even complaints, violative of the
legally frivolous standard. In Mir v. Little Company of Mary
Hospital,"0 7 the court upheld sanctions where the plaintiff
brought an action for $27,000,000 in damages in the face of
99. Id. at 121, 791 P.2d at 545.
100. Id. at 121 n.9, 791 P.2d at 545 n.9.
101. Les Schockley Racing, Inc. v. Nat'l Hot Rod Ass'n, 884 F.2d 504 (9th Cir. 1989)
(although plaintiff's second amended complaint alleging a violation of a Sherman Act
§ 1 was properly dismissed because it inadequately pleaded injury to competition in the
market, the trial court's denial of sanctions upheld).
102. 801 F.2d 1531 (9th Cir. 1986).
103. Id. at 1541.
104. Id. at 1540.
105. Id. at 1535, 1539.
106. Id. at 1542.
107. 844 F.2d 646 (9th Cir. 1988).
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clear authority that the claims were procedurally barred.
Moreover, the court found that the claims were based on cases
that no competent lawyer would believe supported his argu-
ment.l 8 Thus, the "frivolousness" test for an abuse of a
signer's duty to conduct a reasonable inquiry as to the law
appears to establish a high threshold for opposing parties seek-
ing Rule 11 sanctions in the Ninth Circuit.1 9
B. Improper Purpose
The improper purpose prong of the Rule 11 two-part anal-
ysis prohibits a pleading, motion or other paper from being
filed for an "improper purpose, such as to harass or to cause
unnecessary delay or needless increase in the cost of litiga-
tion.""i 0 However, the Ninth Circuit has held that a nonfrivo-
lous complaint cannot be said to be filed for an improper
purpose."' Specifically, in Townsend II, the court made it
clear that the frivolousness inquiry subsumes the improper
purpose inquiry for purposes of reviewing initial complaints." 2
In Zaldivar v. City of Los Angeles," 3 the court held that
the improper purpose must be "objectively tested, rather than
[focused on] the consequences of the signer's act, subjectively
viewed by the signer's opponent.""11 4 Thus, neither the signer's
motive nor the resulting actual harassment, delay, or increase
108. Id. at 652. See also Adriana Corp. v. Lewis & Co., 913 F.2d 1406 (9th Cir. 1990)
(frivolous motion to reconsider); West Coast Theater Corp. v. Portland, 897 F.2d 1519
(9th Cir. 1990) (complete failure to articulate in complaint an adequate foundation in
fact or in law); In re Hawaii Asbestos Cases, 871 F.2d 891 (9th Cir. 1989) (summary
judgment motion); Pine Trades Council of Northern California v. Underground
Contractors Association of Northern California, 835 F.2d 1275 (9th Cir. 1988) (second
motion to compel arbitration, having already appealed identical first motion); In re
Disciplinary Action (Mooney), 823 F.2d 302 (9th Cir. 1988) (removal to federal court
when not all defendants were diverse); Unioil, Inc. v. E.F. Hutton, Inc., 809 F.2d 548,
cert. denied, 108 S. Ct. 83, 85 (9th Cir. 1986) (motion to reconsider); Hewitt v. City of
Stanton, 798 F.2d 1230 (9th Cir. 1986) (petition for removal).
109. See Woodrum v. Woodward County, Oklahoma, 866 F.2d 1121 (9th Cir. 1989).
110. FED. R. CIrv. P. 11.
111. Townsend v. Holman Consulting Corp., 914 F.2d 1136, 1144 n.5 (9th Cir. 1990)
(en banc) (Townsend II) ("The sanctioning of claims in initial complaints will of course
more likely be an abuse of discretion than the sanctioning of other claims.");
Greenberg v. Sala, 822 F.2d 882, 885 (9th Cir. 1987); Golden Eagle Distributing Corp. v.
Burroughs Corp., 801 F.2d 1531, 1538 (9th Cir. 1986); Zaldivar v. City of Los Angeles,
780 F.2d 823, 832 (9th Cir. 1980) ("a defendant cannot be harassed under Rule 11
because a plaintiff files a complaint against that defendant which complies with the'well grounded in fact and warranted by existing law clause' of the Rule").
112. Townsend II, 914 F.2d at 1140, 1144-45.
113. 780 F.2d 823 (9th Cir. 1986).
114. Id. at 832.
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in costs will have any bearing on whether a complaint, which
was well grounded in fact and law violates Rule 11. However,
the court in Zaldivar also found that successive complaints
based upon propositions of law previously rejected may consti-
tute harassment under Rule 11."' In Zaldivar, the issues
raised in federal court had previously been rejected in state
court.
In contrast to initial complaints, pleadings and other
papers may violate Rule 11 without a showing of frivolousness
if they are filed for an improper purpose." 6 Thus, sanctions
for pleadings filed for an improper purpose have been imposed
in the following situations: (1) where the defendant unneces-
sarily delayed and multiplied the proceedings by filing a con-
trived third party complaint in order to induce the district
court to transfer the cause of action;" 7 (2) where the defend-
ant counterclaimed for $200,000 in costs and $4 million in puni-
tive damages in a suit for wage discrimination and wrongful
termination;" 8 (3) where a second motion to compel arbitra-
tion was filed in a labor dispute when the denial of a nearly
identical prior motion had been appealed;".. and (4) for filing a
complaint in district court where there was no federal subject
matter jurisdiction and the plaintiff had previously filed a suit
in another district court on the same claims.' ° Generally,
though, to present a convincing case for Rule 11 sanctions in
the Ninth Circuit, a party must show both a degree of frivo-
lousness coupled with a fairly apparent purpose to harass,
delay, or apply economic pressure.
V. THE APPROPRIATE SANCTION
Focusing on the mandatory language in Rule 11, both the
Ninth Circuit and Washington courts have held that a court
must impose a sanction if it finds that the rule has been vio-
115. Id.
116. Aetna Life Insurance Co. v. Alla Medical Services, Inc., 855 F.2d 1470, 1476
(9th Cir. 1988) ("there comes a point when successive motions and papers become so
harassing and vexatious that they justify sanctions even if they are not totally
frivolous under the standard set forth in our prior cases").
117. Stewart v. American International Oil & Gas, 845 F.2d 196, 201 (9th Cir.
1988).
118. Hudson v. Moore Business Forms, Inc., 836 F.2d 1156 (9th Cir. 1987).
119. Pipe Trades Council of Northern California v. Underground Contractors
Association of Northern California, 835 F.2d 1275 (9th Cir. 1988).
120. Orange Production Credit Association v. Frontline Ventures, Ltd., 792 F.2d
797 (9th Cir. 1986).
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lated.121 However, the permissive language of Rule 11 allowing
an award of reasonable expenses has led to general agreement
that trial courts "retain broad discretion to tailor an 'appropri-
ate sanction' and to determine against whom such a sanction
should be imposed.' 2
While attorneys' fees and costs tend to be the favored form
of sanctions, the Ninth Circuit has noted that Rule 11 was not
designed to provide monetary restitution in every case to a liti-
gant who has been harassed or inconvenienced by the conduct
of opposing counsel.123 Because Rule 11 is not to be used as a
mere fee shifting device, courts have devised other means of
sanctioning attorneys. For example, the Ninth Circuit has
approved publication of reprimands as appropriate sanctions in
some cases.' The Ninth Circuit has also held that the appro-
priate sanction for a Rule 11 violation might include suspen-
sion of an attorney from practice before the court and public
censure.125
Like the Ninth Circuit, Washington courts have frequently
noted that public censure may be an appropriate sanction in
some situations. 126 However, one Washington court has found
public censure alone to be insufficient."l r In Guardianship of
Lasky, the trial court's failure to award terms was held to be
an abuse of discretion considering the large expenditures
incurred in opposing the litigation.'28
In addition to monetary sanctions and public censure, the
Ninth Circuit has also found dismissal of the case to be an
appropriate sanction in certain circumstances.2 9 In Adriana v.
Lewis & Co.,13 ° in addition to imposing Rule 11 sanctions for
121. See Golden Eagle Distributing Corp. v. Burroughs Corp., 801 F.2d 1531, 1536
(9th Cir. 1986); Miller v. Badgley, 51 Wash. App. 285, 300, 753 P.2d 530, 540 (1988).
122. Miller, 51 Wash. App. at 303, 753 P.2d at 540; see also Pony Express Courier
Corp. of America v. Pony Express Delivery Service, 872 F.2d 317, 319 (9th Cir. 1989).
123. Pony Express Courier Corp., 872 F.2d at 319.
124. Id. at 317 (9th Cir. 1989); In re Disciplinary Action (Mooney), 841 F.2d 1003
(9th Cir. 1988); In re Disciplinary Action (David L. Curl), 803 F.2d 1004 (9th Cir. 1986).
125. In re Disciplinary Action (Raymond P. Boucher), 837 F.2d 869 (materially
misrepresenting facts on appeal and failure to respond to order to show cause why
sanctions should not be imposed).
126. Doe v. Spokane & Inland Empire Blood Bank, 55 Wash. App. 106, 780 P.2d
853 (1989); Miller, 51 Wash. App. 285, 753 P.2d 530.
127. Guardianship of Lasky, 54 Wash. App. 841, 776 P.2d 695 (1989).
128. Id. at 855-56, 776 P.2d at 702.
129. Adriana Corp. v. Lewis & Co., 913 F.2d 1406 (9th Cir. 1990); West Coast
Theater Corp. v. Portland, 897 F.2d 1519 (9th Cir. 1990); Zambrano v. City of Tustin,
885 F.2d 1473 (9th Cir. 1989).
130. 913 F.2d 1406 (9th Cir. 1990).
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frivolous motions to reconsider and to disqualify counsel, the
district court used Rule 37 to grant the defendant's motion to
dismiss the complaint, to strike the plaintiff's answers to the
cross and counterclaims, and to enter a default judgment. The
Ninth Circuit upheld the district court's default judgment of
$8.5 million and its award of monetary sanctions for the Rule
11 violations. In addition, the court awarded fees and double
costs for a frivolous appeal under Rule 38. In so doing, the
court also found that counsel's misconduct could be imputed to
his clients.
In contrast, in Zambrano v. City of Tustin, 3' the circuit
court cautioned that, "[a]s a general rule, the minor problems
created by counsel should not be visited upon the litigants.' '1 32
In that case, the district court declared a mistrial because
plaintiff's counsel had never been admitted to the district bar.
The Ninth Circuit held that a mistrial was inappropriate and
that in such a situation "the district court is under an affirma-
tive obligation to explore alternative remedies to dismissal."'"
The Ninth Circuit conducts a three-part analysis to deter-
mine whether a district court has properly considered the ade-
quacy of less drastic sanctions:
(1) did the court explicitly discuss the feasibility of less dras-
tic sanctions and explain why alternative sanctions would be
inappropriate;
(2) did the court implement alternative sanctions before
ordering dismissal; and
(3) did the court warn the party of the possibility of dismis-
sal before actually awarding dismissal?" s
Dismissal was appropriate where counsel repeatedly failed to
respond to the court's warnings, failed to appear at a show
cause hearing, and failed to file papers of opposition or to ask
for a rescheduling of the hearing.135 Thus, where the district
court has attempted other measures to coerce counsel to act
responsibly, it is within the court's discretion to grant sanctions
in the form of dismissal.
Finally, the amended Rule 11 retained the requirement
131. 885 F.2d 1473 (9th Cir. 1989).
132. Id. at 1475 n.4.
133. Id.
134. Adriana, 913 F.2d at 1412-13 (quoting Malone v. United States Postal Service,
833 F.2d 128, 130 (9th Cir. 1987)); West Coast Theatre Corp., 897 F.2d at 1524.
135. West Coast Theater Corp., 897 F.2d at 1524.
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that pleadings, motions and other papers that are not signed
must be stricken. Whether striking a paper signed in violation
of the rule is still appropriate, however, is an open question.
The Advisory Committee Note to the 1983 Amendment com-
mented on the tendency of courts under the former rule to
confuse attorney honesty with the merits of the action. 3 6
Thus, courts will likely continue to disfavor this form of sanc-
tion despite the drafters' specific approval of the courts' broad
discretion to tailor the appropriate sanction to particular facts.
The explosion of Rule 11 motions in recent years is no
doubt driven not only by opposing parties' desire to deter frivo-
lous and improper litigation, but also by a desire to shift the
increasingly heavy economic burden of litigation. Notwith-
standing the conflict with the principles behind the American
Rule, which requires each party to pay his or her own litiga-
tion costs unless a statute or contract of the parties provides
otherwise, the most appropriate form of sanction is likely to
remain an award of reasonable costs and attorneys fees for the
foreseeable future.
Finally, until recently, the Ninth Circuit held that Rule 11
permitted sanctions to be imposed on the signing attorney, the
party he or she represented, or the attorney's firm as a
whole.13 In 1990, the United States Supreme Court held that
the plain language and policies of Rule 11 made it inappropri-
ate to impose sanctions on an entire firm; the court held that
"just as the requirement of a signature is imposed upon the
individual ... the recited import and consequences of signa-
ture run as to him. ' -s Thus, an attorney's duty of reasonable
inquiry is nondelegable; moreover,
[t]he signing attorney cannot leave it to some trusted
subordinate, or to one of his partners, to satisfy himself that
the filed paper is factually and legally responsible; by signing
he represents not merely the fact that it is so, but also the
fact that he personally has applied his own judgment.13 9
136. Fed. R. Civ. P. 11 Advisory committee's note to 1983 amendment.
137. See Business Guides, Inc. v. Chromatic Communications Enterprises, 892 F.2d
802 (9th Cir. 1989); Hudson v. Moore Business Forms, Inc., 836 F.2d 1156 (9th Cir.
1987).
138. Pavelic & Leflore v. Marvel Entertainment Group, 40 S.Ct, 456, 459 (1990)
(emphasis in original).
139. Id. While the majority opinion relies heavily on the clear language of the
rule, Justice Marshall's dissent is worth noting. He states:
Yet encouraging individual accountability and firm accountability are not
mutually exclusive goals. Indeed, individual accountability may be heightened
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Consequently, where sanctions were previously imposed on an
entire firm, the Ninth Circuit has remanded for disposition in
light of the Supreme Court's pronouncement that Rule 11
sanctions apply only to the individual signing attorneys.' 4 °
In addition, the Supreme Court pronounced in 1990 that
Rule 11 applies only to proceedings at the trial court level;
therefore, use of Rule 11 to impose sanctions on appeal is inap-
propriate. 141 If an appeal of Rule 11 sanctions is frivolous,
appellate courts have recourse to Federal Rule of Appellate
Procedure 38, which allows for just damages and single or
double costs.
However, in Partington v. Gedan, the Ninth Circuit has
chosen to disregard this clear directive from the Supreme
Court.142 In that case, a two judge majority of the Ninth Cir-
cuit determined that there was no conflict with Cooter & Gell
because Circuit Rule 1-1 (old Rule 5) and prior case law of the
Ninth Circuit expressly incorporates Rule 11 into the appellate
court rules. 43 Thus, at least currently, the Ninth Circuit may
impose sanctions pursuant to Rule 11 at the appellate level as,
in effect, part of its Circuit rules.1 "
A separate consideration is the appropriate time to ask for
sanctions. While counsel may be tempted to wait until the
completion of litigation to document a clear pattern of abuse, 4 '
due process concerns may be raised where the offending party
when an attorney understands that his carelessness or maliciousness may
subject both himself and his firm to liability. The concern that a person take
direct responsibility for each paper is not disserved by holding the law firm
responsible in cases where the district court determines that both are
blameworthy.
Admittedly, in some cases, sanctions imposed solely on the individual signer
may halt abusive practices most effectively. In other cases, however,
deterrence might best be served by imposing sanctions on the signer's law
firm in an attempt to encourage internal monitoring. The trial judge is in the
best position to assess the dynamics of each situation and to act accordingly.
Id. at 461-62 (Marshall, J., dissenting).
140. Hudson v. Moore Business Forms, Inc., 898 F.2d 654, 687 (9th Cir. 1990).
141. Cooter & Gell v. Hartmarx, 110 S.Ct. 2447, 2462 (1990).
142. Partington v. Gedan, 914 F.2d 1349 (9th Cir. 1990) (Reinhardt, J., dissenting)
(previously reported at 880 F.2d 116 (9th Cir. 1989)), vacated and remanded, 110 S. Ct.
3265 (1990), for further consideration in light of Cooter & Gell.
143. Id. at 1349-50.
144. Id.
145. See Aetna Life Insurance Co. v. Alla Medical Services, Inc., 855 F.2d 1470 (9th
Cir. 1988) (remanded to determine if cumulative effects of defendant's litigation tactics
would indicate an improper purpose in filing motion to dismiss).
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has insufficient notice or opportunity to defend his or her tac-
tics.1 6 In the Ninth Circuit, at least, the mere presence of
Rule 11 is not sufficient "notice" to satisfy the requirement of
due process. 47 Furthermore, a minimum requirement that the
certifying attorney be warned that Rule 11 sanctions may be
assessed at the end of trial, if appropriate, is consistent with
the Rule 11 purposes of avoiding delay and unnecessary cost by
deterring future violations and correcting behavior.14s
Finally, counsel should avoid the cavelier use of Rule 11.
The court may view dimly the use of Rule 11 "out of habit or
as a standard device to burden an adversary with responses on
issues collateral to the merits of a claim.' 49  Thus, too fre-
quent use of casually drafted Rule 11 motions may prompt a
court to "give scrutiny to the Rule 11 movant equal to that
they afford the Rule 11 target."'"
VI. APPELLATE REVIEW
After the Supreme Court's decision in Cooter & Gell v.
Hartmarx,151 the Ninth Circuit and Washington courts now
apply the same standard of appellate review to an award of
Rule 11 sanctions: abuse of discretion. Prior to Cooter & Gell,
the Ninth Circuit applied the same standards to review a Rule
11 order as it applied to other similar, final determinations of
the trial court. 15 2  Thus, previously the appellate court
reviewed: (1) factual determinations only for clear error; (2)
legal conclusions de novo; and (3) the appropriateness of the
sanction imposed for abuse of discretion. 153
However, in Cooter & Cell, the Supreme Court specifically
considered the validity of the Ninth Circuit's tripartite stan-
dard of review for Rule 11 sanctions. The Court rejected this
standard and replaced it with a unitary abuse of discretion
146. Tom Growney Equipment, Inc. v. Shelly Irrigation Development, Inc., 834
F.2d 833 (9th Cir. 1987). See also In re Taylor, 884 F.2d 478 (9th Cir. 1989).
147. Tom Growney Equipment, 834 F.2d at 836 n.5.
148. Matter of Yagman, 796 F.2d 1165, 1184 (9th Cir. 1986).
149. Townsend v. Holman Consulting Corp., 881 F.2d 788, 797 (9th Cir. 1989),
vacated, 914 F.2d 1136 (9th Cir. 1990) (en banc) (Townsend 1).
150. Id.
151. 110 S.Ct. 2447 (1990).
152. Zaldivar v. City of Los Angeles, 780 F.2d 823, 828 n.4 (9th Cir. 1986).
153. See, e.g., United States Energy Owners Committee, Inc. v. United States
Energy Management Systems, 837 F.2d 356, 364 (9th Cir. 1988) (citing Zaldivar v. City
of Los Angeles, 780 F.2d 823, 828 (9th Cir. 1986).
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standard for all aspects of a Rule 11 proceeding. M Although
the Supreme Court articulated an across the board abuse of
discretion standard for all aspects of a Rule 11 inquiry, it did
caution that such a standard "would not preclude the appellate
court's correction of a district court's legal errors, e.g.,... rely-
ing on a materially incorrect view of the relevant law in deter-
mining that a pleading was not 'warranted by existing law or a
good faith argument for changing the law."'" In response to
Cooter & Gell, the Ninth Circuit has substituted a unitary
abuse of discretion standard for its previous tripartite standard
of review.'5
Washington courts, on the other hand, originally adopted
across the board abuse of discretion appellate review. 57 Wash-
ington courts were concerned that to do otherwise would
impose a "chilling effect on the [trial] court's willingness to
impose CR 11 sanctions."'" The Washington courts' standard
would seem to discourage a probing review of the lower court's
discretion. However, the appellate court was not reluctant to
find an abuse of discretion where the trial court failed to
award terms when it should have;" 9 and it has remanded for
further findings on the attorney's conduct where the claims
appeared facially frivolous but no sanctions were awarded."6
These cases indicate that appellate review in the Washington
courts is likely to remain vigorous.
VII. CONCLUSION
According to Professor Arthur Miller of the Harvard Law
School and Reporter to the Advisory Committee, the Commit-
tee had two fears when amending Rule 11 in 1983: that Rule
11 would be as little used as Rule 37 had been or that Rule 11
would be overused.161 Dramatizing the fear of overuse and the
resulting satellite litigation over the appropriateness of sanc-
154. Cooter & Gell, 40 S. Ct. 2447, 2461.
155. Id. at 2459.
156. E.g., Adriana International Corp. v. Lewis & Co., 913 F.2d 1406 (9th Cir. 1990);
Townsend v. Holman Consulting Corp., 914 F.2d 1136 (9th Cir. 1990) (en banc)
(Townsend I).
157. Bryant v. Joseph Tree, Inc., 57 Wash. App. 107, 115, 791 P.2d 537, 542 (1990);
Doe v. Spokane & Inland Empire Blood Bank, 55 Wash. App. 106,110, 780 P.2d 853, 856
(1989); Cooper v. Viking Ventures, 53 Wash. App. 739, 743, 770 P.2d 659, 661 (1989).
158. Cooper, 53 Wash. App. at 743, 770 P.2d at 661.
159. Guardianship of Lasky, 54 Wash. App. 841, 848, 776 P.2d 695, 702 (1989).
160. Spokane & Inland Empire, 55 Wash. App. at 112, 780 P.2d at 857.
161. Vairo, supra note 7, at 195, citing remarks of Professor Arthur Miller,
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tions, Professor Miller described his own "'Kafkaesque dream'
of courts being besieged by motions to sanction attorneys for
making frivolous motions for sanctions.' '1 62
Perhaps in response to such concerns, the Ninth Circuit
Court of Appeals early recognized the burden of increased
activity in the district courts which would inevitably result
from too liberal application of Rule 11.163 The prudently cau-
tious acceptance of the courts' new weapon has not been with-
out controversy, even within the Ninth Circuit.' But, while
the Ninth Circuit has continued to be "dovish" in its approach
to Rule 11 sanctions, a willingness to impose sanctions to deter
truly egregious conduct is equally clear from the reported
opinions; furthermore, although not likely to transform a dove
into a hawk, the opinion in Townsend II may lead to a some-
what more frequent use of sanctions.
While far fewer cases involving sanctions under amended
Washington State CR 11 have reached the appellate level, the
state appellate courts seem to give solid encouragement to the
use of the amended rule to curb abuses in attorney conduct. It
is the authors' belief that this encouragement has produced
results, especially with some King County Superior Court
judges. There are at least a few instances where superior court
judges have seemingly ignored the purposes and limits of Rule
11 and have applied it solely as a means to shift fees to the los-
ing party on a motion. Washington courts have placed less
emphasis on, or ignored, the technical limitations imposed by
the specific language of the Rule, seemingly regarding Rule 11
at least in part as another extension of the inherent power of
the courts to control their cases.
While Professor Miller's Kafkaesque dream does not
appear to have come to pass in the Ninth Circuit or in the state
courts of Washington, the authors believe that a more dis-
turbing nightmare may be threatening. In the authors' view,
some amended Rule 11 proceedings appear to be reflecting the
highly publicized decline in professionalism and courtesy
among members of the trial bar. The use, or threat of use, of
Reporter to the Advisory Committee, Federal Bar Council Annual Winter Meeting
(February 1987).
162. Judicial Conference-Second Circuit, 101 F.R.D. 161, 200 (1984).
163. See Golden Eagle Distributing Corp. v. Burroughs Corp., 801 F.2d 1531, 1537
(9th Cir. 1986).
164. See Golden Eagle Distributing Corp. v. Burroughs Corp., 809 F.2d 584 (9th
Cir. 1987).
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Rule 11 motions to shift litigation costs to the opponent, as a
bargaining chip in settlement negotiations, or simply to
appease an outraged client, has been noted on an increasing
number of occasions at least in Western Washington's metro-
politan areas. If such misuse of the rule, the plain purpose of
which is to curb litigation abuse, is accepted by courts, a highly
valuable tool will have been not lost but perverted. Federal
district courts in Western Washington, taking their cue no
doubt from the Ninth Circuit as well as from the extensive
preappointment trial practice experience of many of the sitting
judges, appear to have evolved a philosophy for applying Rule
11 which will serve to curb genuine abuses without abetting
inappropriate litigation tactics. An additional reason for this
successful evolution is the facility with which the judges of the
western district are able to exchange views among themselves.
It is the authors' impression based on anecdotal informa-
tion, and some direct experience, that the present application
of Rule 11 at the state trial court level is far more idiosyncratic
and on occasion less in keeping with the salutary purpose of
the rule. The authors, like the rest of the bar, have gained
most of the information on which this tentative conclusion is
founded on word of mouth, grapevine, and inquiry since most
Rule 11 decisions are not appealed and many at both the cir-
cuit and district court levels are not published."6 In state
court, of course, no trial court opinions are published. The
authors believe that the information regarding enforcement
practices and philosophies concerning Rule 11 which would be
most useful to both trial lawyers and judges will be gained by
timely familiarity with trial court decisions, the overwhelming
majority of which will never be appealed. The existing infor-
mation gap should be eliminated or reduced as much and as
soon as possible. This could be accomplished by a carefully
planned survey of district court and state superior court Rule
11 decisions conducted on a periodic basis (annually or bi-annu-
ally). Such a survey would be of great service to the courts and
the bar by accurately and in a timely fashion communicating
trends, standards, and practices under the rule.
Another mechanism for gaining a better understanding of
Rule l1's function in actual practice would be the formation of
a standing committee of the Washington State Bar Association,
165. A West Law search discloses 82 unpublished Rule 11 opinions in the Ninth
Circuit between January 1, 1989, and October 31, 1990.
[Vol. 14:419
Current Status of Rule 11
composed of trial lawyers and federal and state judges. The
committee could review trial court decisions under Rule 11,
exchange views on the implementation of the rule, and publish
a bimonthly or semi-annual summary in the Washington State
Bar News. These proposals are not intended to be definitive
but to stimulate thinking on the subject.
Admittedly, amended Rule 11 has stirred up a great deal
of controversy. The Advisory Committee of which Professor
Miller is now a member will be considering a variety of pro-
posed amendments to the Rule. While in Seattle for the 1991
spring meeting of the American Bar Association, Professor
Miller expressed his own personal hope that the Rule be left
unchanged for now, predicting that the upsurge in its use (and
misuse) will follow a bell-shaped curve. The authors concur
with the hope that it be left unchanged until the bench and bar
have had both additional time to develop the limits of salutary
enforcement and the opportunity to create means for assisting
that process such as those suggested in this essay.
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